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Highway construction projects serve as a good example where society can benefit 
from fast completion. A+B auctions, a type of innovative scoring auctions,  
address this concern by incentivizing timely completion through scores that combine 
price and time incentives. In the first part of the dissertation, I investigate in A+B 
auctions by building a theory of A+B bidding that incorporates incentives and production 
uncertainty, as well as structurally estimating bidding behaviors and auction performance 
using data from the California Department of Transportation (Caltran). I find that, in 
equilibrium, bidders skew the days bid below the true planned construction target days to 
raise the price bids. Moreover, self-selected construction time that is different from the 
expected social-optimal time causes ex post efficiency loss and the auction mechanism 
can fail at picking the socially-efficient bidders ex ante. Counterfactual analysis suggests 
that procuring schemes with lower incentives or even conversion back to traditional 
contracts are likely to yield better social outcomes. 
Usually, highway procurement auctions across the U.S. take the form of Unit-
Price Contracts (UPCs), where the department of transportation (DOT) gives quantity 
estimates for different tasks of the project and the bidders attach unit-price bids on each 
of the tasks and form a single total bid. During the construction phase, the DOT makes 
progress payments, usually monthly, to the contractor for tasks completed in the previous 
month. Moreover, the payments are determined by the actual quantities incurred although 
the total bids ex ante are evaluated based on the DOT estimates. A forward-looking 
contractor would want to maximize the expected total present value by shifting more 
 iii 
weight toward early tasks and tasks that the bidders believe to overrun compared to the 
DOT estimates. These two types of bid skewing lead to what is generally known in the 
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CHAPTER ONE
INCENTIVE MECHANISMS IN “COST + TIME”
AUCTIONS
1 Introduction
In highway construction industry, the uniqueness of the projects, transparency
and private information of costs give rise to auctions being the means of buying
projects. Traditional bidding methods (where bidders bid on project costs only),
however, do not address the concerns beyond taxpayers’ bucks, thus no competition
over completion time or other dimensions of quality is allowed. Over decades, many
efforts have been spent on discovery of innovative procurement methods. Among the
industries, highway construction makes for a good case study for this is an industry
where huge amounts of externalities for commuters are observed in terms of traffic
delay caused by construction on the road.1
In 1991, the Federal Highway Administration recommended that the departments
of transportation (DOTs) around the U.S. start to experiment with a novel bidding
1The example used in Lewis and Bajari(2011a) gives readers some idea on the magnitude of the
externalities. “For example, US 101 is an important highway through Silicon Valley, carrying over
175,000 commuters per day. If a highway construction project results in a 30-minute delay each way
for commuters on this route, the daily social cost imposed by the construction would be 175,000
hours. Valuing time at $10 an hour, this implies a social cost of $1.75 million per day.”
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mechanism which they called A+B, or ‘cost plus time’. ‘A’ stands for the traditional
dollar amount of the bid, and ‘B’ is the public cost of the project, which is the per-
day road user cost (government-assessed dollar-amount externality of construction
work to commuters) multiplied by the number of days bid by contractors. A+B gives
the score, and the contractor with the lowest score wins the auction and gets paid
by A when the construction completes. In the case of late delivery, penalty gets
excercised which is usually the amount of per-day user cost times the number of days
the contractor is late by (construction days minus the days bid in the score). These
innovative contractual formats were tried in several states and then gradually gained
popularity across America over the last few decades. Today, almost all of the DOTs
are adopting A+B or some variants of A+B (Strong, Raadt and Tometich(2006)).
Clearly, the monetary incentive in the score is intended to incentivize contractors
to speed up construction when it is cost-effective to do so. This is made possible by
the design of the scoring rule which creates tradeoffs between price bids and time bids:
holding the score (thus the chance of winning) constant, bidders can either choose a
high price and tight schedule, or a long duration and fewer bucks. Bidders’ actual
opportunity costs of being late, though, might be higher than, equal to, or lower than
the explicit monetary incentives layed out in the scores for various reasons. What is
equally plausible is bidders’ heterogeneity in these opportunity costs. Thus discussion
of bidder optimality cannot be made complete or credible without recognizing both
the monetary incentives and the opportunity costs.
Construction uncertainty is well-aknowledged in highway construction industry.
Construction time, or the duration of the project, is a simultaneous result of con-
tractors’ optimization outcome, contractor-project shocks (e.g. input delays, mal-
functioning equipments, bad progress plan and execution) as well as nature’s work
(some idiosyncratic shocks that are beyond contractors’ control, such as weather, local
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events, earthquakes). A contractor, facing a great deal of uncertainty once the produc-
tion begins, would incorporate this uncertainty in her bidding and planning decisions
at the bid-preparing stage, and this may be even more relevant when high-powered
incentive and disincentives come into play in A+B auctions. With uncertainty as one
extra layer of the complex procuring problem, effective policy design is of an even
greater importance and much more discretion is needed in analyzing the underlying
mechanism of private bidding behaviors.
In this paper, I investigate in the efficiency and effectiveness of A+B procuring
mechanism featuring both incentives and production uncertainty. I first incorporate
production uncertainty into a theory of equilibrium bidder behavior in an A+B con-
tracting environment. I characterize the equilibrium bidding behavior and discuss
the efficiency of A+B mechanism. Second, I provide descriptive and reduced-form
evidence that is consistent with the theory predictions. Next, I carry out a structural
analysis on the performance of A+B auctions under uncertainty. Last, I evaluate
the advantages and disadvantages of the current A+B contract design based on the
empirical evidence and through the construction of counterfactual alternatives.
I find that bidders strategically skew their bids—when the underlying opportunity
cost is too high compared to the monetary incentive, bidders find it optimal to bid
conservatively, i.e., the time bid would be greater than their planned construction time
to leave some contingency time in light of heavy penalties. On the other hand, when
the opportunity cost of being late is relatively mild, bidders would bid aggressively
by shading their time bid under the planned construction days since doing this will
push up the price part while holding the score constant. And this latter case is what
my empirics supports.
I demonstrate that current A+B policy is sub-optimal in that it is both ex-post
inefficient and ex-ante inefficient. Once uncertainty is built into the model, bidders’
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behaviors most likely deviate from the first-best point. In particular, my structural
estimation shows that the contracting environment is such that most bids observed
are well below the true construction target time of bidders. As long as costs are
convex with respect to time, different target times other than the first-best points
mean welfare loss to society. Furthermore, bid skewing may also lead to ex-ante
inefficiency due to the possible wrong rank order of bidders and hence inability of the
auction mechanism to assign the project to the most socially efficient bidder.
I provide evidence and support for converting the current A+B provision to a more
‘low-powered’ incentive framework or even back to traditional bidding through the
construction of counterfactuals. Based on the estimates of the structural elements,
varying the policy parameter (coefficient in B part) does bring down the actual tar-
get time as well as the bid days, but the bid skewing pattern remains with similar
magnitude. As incentives are made stronger, Caltran’s payments (price bids of win-
ners) increase more than commuters’ welfares gain. Combining the considerations
of commuter welfare, private construction cost, and government budget, I argue for
procuring schemes with lower incentives than current or even conversion back to tra-
ditional contracts. And this policy implication is direct and intuitive since under
current framework, bidders’ actual construction behaviors are indeed not much dif-
ferent than what they would have been had the projects procured the traditional
way.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper so far that tries to structurally investigate
in A+ B procurement auctions featuring both uncertainty and incentives. Lewis and
Bajari (2011a) is the first analysis of A+B auctions by economists. The find that
A+B successfully aligns private interests with public ones and both ex-ante and ex-
post efficiency can be achieved, however this finding essentially builds upon the crucial
assumption of construction certainty and may overlook the possible skewing behaviors
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of bidders who balance uncertainty and incentives. And this naturally leads to welfare
calculations of theirs dramatically differ than mine.
The findings in this paper may also contribute to the classical principle-agent
problem with detailed analysis of field data on auctions. Well-known works such
as Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) stresses on the importance to analyze incentive
problems in their totality. And this paper provides real-world evidence and extends
our knowledge on how certain contractual designs collapse when incentives and risk
are incorrectly and incompletely addressed. Lewis and Bajari (2013) demonstrate how
incentives and risk can affect ex-post work rate in highway procurements by focusing
on traditional contracts, and they find evidence of post-contractual moral hazard. The
striking difference of this paper, though, is the discovery of ex-ante distortions once
integrating incentive design, risk and bidding rules into bidders ex-ante optimization.
This paper is closely related to the emerging literature of theoretical and empirical
scoring auctions. Theories such as Che(1993), Asker and Cantillon(2008) give rigorous
treatments on and analyze properties of scoring auctions. Empirical studies such as
Athey and Levin (2001), Bajari, Houton and Tadalis(2014), Miller(2014) investigate
in contractual environments where submitted bids are inner products of quantities
and unit prices and they elaborate on bidders’ bid skewing behaviors. In my paper,
the aggressive bidding is essentially bid skewing, too, with two dimensions instead of
many to skew along—price and days bid.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the background
and contractual environments of A+B auctions, and also points out the key features of
A+B procurements. Section 3 presents a theory of A+B bidding with incentives and
uncertainty. Section 4 discusses the data and provides descriptive evidence. Section
5 presents the structural estimation. Section 6 conducts policy analysis and performs
counterfactual investigations. Section 7 concludes.
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2 A+B highway procurement projects in
California
With the purpose of promoting welfare to traveling public by reducing commuting
time in work zones, the California Department of Transportation started to encourage
the use of A+B contracts on highway procurement in late 2002. According to the
Caltran “Guidelines for Use of A+B Bidding Provisions”, “A+B provisions should be
included in projects meeting selection criteria including estimated cost of $5 million
or more and daily user delay cost of $5,000 or more”, although exceptions to the
criteria can be made.
Usually, the implementation of A+B projects in California goes through several
phases. First, the engineers at Caltrans design the project once a need is identified.
The engineers come up with 3 estimates: an estimate of the cost of the project, the
per-day user delay cost and an estimate of the time of project delivery. Usually the
engineer estimated days is a generous measure of completion time hence any bids on
the B part exceeding the engineer days estimate would be rendered irresponsive and
will not be considered by Caltran.2 The terms of the contract are summarized in the
project special provision and its addendums. The special provision specifies that the
contract will be awarded to the bidder with the lowest score and the winner have to
deliver the project within its days bid. If late completion takes place, penalties are
charged. A majority of the contents are dedicated to various construction specifica-
tions. What is also included is a set of specifications on maximum number of lanes
that can be closed at each phase of the projects, whether there are and how much
the penalties are if lanes are reopened late than specified and so on.
2Actually, Caltran specifically mentions in the “Guidelines for Use of A+B Bidding Provisions”
that “On typical A+B projects, working days are defined...the same as for traditional projects.”
6
Next, the project gets advertised and interested parties can obtain information
of the plan and special provisions. Before bidding and after advertisement, Caltran
might find the need to issue one or multiple addendums that supplement the original
special provision. And the provision and its addendums together constitute the legal
contract between Caltran and the auction winner. After studying and evaluating
the project specifications and addendums, bidders bid on the contract, according
to the scoring rule specified in the contract. Then Caltran opens bidding results
and announces the winner. Then, the contract is awarded to the bidder with the
lowest score3 and the phase of construction begins. At the start of construction
phase, the winning contractor decides on the amount of capital equipments and man
power that go into the production. Throughout the production process, shocks take
place and affect the planned schedule. During the whole phase of construction, the
project engineer conducts random checks on quality and schedules, meanwhile the
performance of the contractor is recorded and progress payments are made to the
contractor.
Last, after the project is finished, the contractor gets paid the amount they bid less
the progress payments over the construction phase as well as any damages occurred
for late completion.
Usually the contractor plans the project schedule with sophisticated computer
softwares using Critical Path Method (CPM) that basically groups activities into
critical-path activities and off-path activities. Activities on the path are critical at
influencing the pace of the project, while off-path activities can give the contrac-
tor some time slack. Thus any shock to the earlier activities would likely result in
3Normally after announcement, losers of the auction can have bid protests against the winner, by
showing evidence to Caltran of the winner’s violation of bidding rules or incapability of performing
the work. If protests are supported by Caltran, project goes to next eligible low bidder; otherwise,
auction result remains.
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postponed start of later activities on the chain, causing extension of the scheduled
completion date.
Project risks can come from multiple sources such as input delays, mal-functioning
equipments, bad progress plan and execution, failure in coordination between prime
contractor, subcontractors and suppliers, as well as some idiosyncratic shocks that are
beyond contractors’ control (weather, local events, earthquakes, and etc.). Roughly
speaking, contractors can ‘get away’ with factors that they don’t have control over,
and waived of the damages and disruptions of project schedule. But there is still
plenty room for things to go wrong on their part which is not compensable.
As project process, the contractor usually gets paid monthly. In the monthly
payment vouchers, the Caltran engineers keep records of how the projects proceed.
They do so by counting weather days, the total work days and its break down to
actual work days, contract change-order days and other days. Weather days are “Days
on which the Contractor is prevented by inclement weather or conditions resulting
immediately therefrom adverse to the current controlling operation or operations, as
determined by the Engineer, from proceeding with at least 75 percent of the normal
labor and equipment force engaged on that operation or operations for at least 60
percent of the total daily time being currently spent on the controlling operation
or operations”. Although contractors will not be charged for a working days when
above conditions for a weather day is met, they can choose to work on the portion of
the day when the weather becomes suitable for construction4. Contract change order
days are generally working days when the contractor performs tasks by the change
orders that add or deduct work items from the original plan. Normally these days
are not counted toward project deadline and the extra work performed is usually
4Refer to “State of California Department of Transportation Construction Standard Specifications
May 2006” for more details and explanations.
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compensable. It seems that Caltran has a broad definition of ‘Other days’ that are
roughly days they grant the contractor as time extension for various reasons. ‘Other
days’ are counted as working days, too5.
3 Theory
3.1 Model Set-up
Let risk-neutral bidders be indexed by i, and let contracts be indexed by j.
The government is the buyer, whose preference of the project j is specified as:
U(qj, Pj;CUj) = −CUjqj − Pj, where qj is a quality measure, herein the number of
days to complete the project, and Pj is the price bid for the project. CUj is the
constant and contract-specific per-day externality in dollars. The functional format
of governments preference is self-explanatory: completing the project j by one more
day costs society welfare loss of CUj.
With time incentives, it is very reasonable to argue that bidders cost functions
should have two parameters: one that controls the traditional material cost and the
other governs the acceleration cost (how costly to accelerate) 6.The cost structure of
bidder i for project j is a function of time:
Cij(qij; q
e
j , αij, βij) = αij + e
βij(q
e
j−qij), qij ∈ [qcpij , qej ] (1)
where the bidder type parameters αij (one that controls the material costs or fixed
5Caltran terminated the use of ‘Other days’ starting in 2012 by demanding all time extensions
should go through contract change orders
6Asker and Cantillon (2010) has a linear, separate and additive cost curve in quality, where fixed
cost is a lump sum and quality comes at a constant marginal cost. Lewis and Bajari (2011a) also has
a separate additive cost structures with a log-linear specification of marginal costs of acceleration,
assuming all bidders’ costs have the same elasticity with respect to acceleration. In this paper I
follow their lead and take the separate and additive functional form.
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costs), βij (one that controls the acceleration costs) are jointly distributed following
some joint distribution function G(α, β) on the support [α, ᾱ] x [β, β̄]. The first and
second derivatives of cost with respect to q are: Cq < 0, Cqq > 0, that is, by having a
negative exponential type of cost function, I assume not only costly but increasingly
costly acceleration.
qej is engineer-estimated days for project j, which, according to both Caltran and
industry practitioners, is a generous measure of the length of production. In fact,
Caltran clearly states in the advertisement that no time bids should go beyond the
engineer-estimated days. A comparison of A+B and traditional contracts of similar
work type and scale indicates that the engineer estimates are about the same. Thus,
the engineer-estimated days serves as a good approximation of the amount of time
bidders would finish the project had it been procured the traditional way. qcpij is the
‘crash-point’ of a contractor i performing project j: number of days under which it
is infinitely costly or impossible for this contractor to finish the job. Thus the cost




Let indexes be dropped from here on and we have:
C(q; qe, α, β) = α + eβ(q
e−q), q ∈ [qcp, qe] , and
Fixed cost (or material cost)= α + 1, and
Acceleration Cost = eβ(q
e−q), and
Marginal cost=−βeβ(qe−q)
The position of one bidders cost curve is determined by the contract and bidder
characteristics, both observed and unobserved, as well as the firms random draw of
parameter α: firms that take bigger and more complex projects have cost curves
farther out in the cost-day space; everything else the same, a bidder is a weaker com-
petitor/expensive contractor if her draw of α is greater and the bidder is stronger(less
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costly) if her draw of α is lower. β determines the convexity (or specialization) of
bidders cost functions: with α being constant, greater β means it is more expensive
for this bidder to accelerate, or, her cost curve is steeper in the cost-day space.
Now I introduce 3 more time quantity variables that are of crucial importance: qa,
qb, and qc. Because of unforeseen productivity shocks that take place after bidding,
the actual days of delivery should be a stochastic outcome instead of that of the
contractor’s choosing. Although contractors can plausibly make some arrangements
and adjustments, once a series of shocks happen throughout the construction phase,
the course of the construction would go beyond the contractor’s complete control,
leading to a realized time of delivery, qa. And this realized quantity determines the
realized cost at the end of production. The best an experienced contractor can do is
guess the expected value of qa correctly at qc, the target of completion time. That
is, the bidder chooses certain amount of equipment and labor at the beginning of
the project, with a goal of days to finish the job—qc. As the construction proceeds
and nature does its work, the bidder finally gets a realization of the radom variable
qa, and in the long run the realizations should center at qc. In terms of bidding, the
contractor proposes a time of qb in the score she submits, and this quantity may or
may not be identical with the target time or actual time. In fact, the bidder optimizes
her expected payoff by choosing simultaneously qb and qc: choose a qb to compete for
the job and choose a scale and intensity of work (qc) to perform the job.
Although the explicit per-day penalty of being late is CUj, the bidder-contract
specific true penalty CDij might differ for several reasons. First, true penalties can be
far more severe if bidders value reputation and relation/future business with Caltran.
Second, CDij might even be lower than CUj if Caltran does not fully enforce the
penalty. Last, highway projects sometimes take multiple years to finish and the
penalties usually do not be exercised until the end of the project, and this renders
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being late less penalizing once the time value of money is taken into account7.
Last, let the distribution function of the random variable qa be F (with its asso-
ciated pdf f), centered at qc with variance σ
2, over the range of [qcp, qe].
3.2 The Bidder’s Optimization Problem
A risk-neutral representative bidder would like to choose two things, a price P and
qc, to maximize her profit once she has won the auction with a score S̄ to fulfill:
MaxΠP,qc = P − Eqa [C(qa; qe, α, β)]− Eqa [D(qa, qb, CD)] (2)
subject to S̄ = P + CUqb, q
cp ≤ qc ≤ qe, and qcp ≤ qb ≤ qe
where D(qa, qb, CD) is the amount of possible disincentive payments from the bidder
to Caltran if work is late. Particularly,
D(qc, qb, CU) =

(qc − qb)CU , if qc > qb
0, otherwise
Substituting the scoring rule, we have:
MaxΠqb,qc = S̄ − CUqb − Eqa [C(qa; qe, α, β)]− Eqa [D(qa, qb, CD)] (3)








CD(t− qb)f(t; qc)dt (4)
subject to qcp ≤ qc ≤ qe, and qcp ≤ qb ≤ qe
7There is an acknowledgement in the industry that bidders might find it optimal to skew bids
more on items that can finish earlier (thus also get paid earlier) than items that finish later. This
practice is called ‘front loading’ and might be plausibly due to the time value of money and firms’
need for cash flows.
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That is, the bidder chooses the target construction time and days bid to minimize
the combined externality, expected private construction cost and the expected dis-
incentive payments. Clearly, there are two kinds of trade-offs faced by the bidder:
choosing a target construction too big (qc large) can help save on costs, but might
as well increase the risk of going late and paying penalties; bidding too aggressively
(qb small) means a certain higher price offer while maintaining the same score, but
higher risk of running late. Thus, the bidder must balance the trade-offs to achieve
optimality and this is admittedly a delicate matter.
Although giving intuitive and qualitative predictions, the model above does not
readily lead to mathematical and econometrical meanings without any assumptions
on the distributions of construction time. Normality is plausibly a good assump-
tion without much loss of generality. To be more specific, let us assume that the
distribution f(qa; qc) is the pdf of a truncated normal distribution on [q
cp, qe].















= 1− F (q∗b ; q∗c ) (6)
Equations (5) and (6) jointly characterizes the bidder’s (with type β) optimal
choices on qb and qc, given the form of distribution, and CU , CD. Equation (5) can be











and the (absolute value of the) slope of the cost curve at the optimal target days
q∗c . In (6), the relative magnitudes of CU and CD along with the distribution of
uncertainty determine the differences in q∗b and q
∗
c . The following is a list of three
possible relations between q∗b and q
∗
c .
8Detailed proof is given in Appendix
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c . The bidder bids more days than the target
construction time to leave some contingency time in light of large amount of penalties.
Larger the CD, more conservative the bid.




c . In this special case, the bidder’s days
bid coincide with her target time, and the bidding looks like one where there is no
uncertainty.




c . If the true penalty CD is less than 2CU ,
the bidder finds it optimal to bid more aggressive than her target work rate. As CD
decreases, it becomes more likely that the best strategy is bid as little as one can9,
since the possible penalties are not sufficient to compensate the higher price one can
bid.
3.3 A Brief Detour: Optimality under Certainty
Before going to more predictions of the model, it pays to first look at how a bidder
bidding for a project with certainty would strategize. With certainty, Equation (2)
becomes:
MaxΠP,qc = P − C(qc; qe, α, β)−D(qc, qb, CD) (7)
subject to S̄ = P + CUqb, q
cp ≤ qc ≤ qe, and qcp ≤ qb ≤ qe
With substitution of the scoring rule, we have:
MaxΠqb,qc = S̄ − CUqb − C(qc; qe, α, β)−D(qc, qb, CD) (8)
9Idealy, the bidder would push this strategy to the extreme, that is, bid just 1 day and finish
with the target of qc and pay possible penalties. But in reality, such bids are considered irregular
and even non-responsive, thus tend to get rejected by Caltran. Thus, the lowest she can bid is the
‘crash point’ qcp.
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subject to qcp ≤ qc ≤ qe, and qcp ≤ qb ≤ qe
We can take the following approach to come to the bidder’s best strategy. Let the
choice of qc be fixed for now at an arbitrary level and (thus the cost of production is
also fixed) and let CD ≥ CU . Then the bidder would choose qb to be equal to qc, for the
following reasons: 1. There is no early-completion reward, so the bidder does not bid
more than qc. That is, when qb happens to be greater than qc, decreasing qb is strictly
dominant since it leads to increase in price without increase in penalty. 2. When qb
happens to be less than qc, increasing qb by 1 unit means a decrease in penalty by
CD and at the same time a decrease in price by CU . Thus pushing qb up toward qc
is strictly dominant when CD > CU and weakly dominant when CD = CU . Hence,
there will be no dichotomy of qb and qc under certainty with CD ≥ CU : the bidder
would finish exactly on the date she bids in the score10. In the case of CD < CU ,
however, bidders would push down qb as much as possible by similar reasoning and
bid skewing takes place in this case.
In all three cases, however, it should be clear that choice of qc is determinted by the
tangency of the cost function and the scoring rule. Matching the negative marginal
cost of the bidder with the user cost CU gives the following first-order condition:
CU = βe
β(qe−q∗c ) (9)
The nature of A+B auctions fits into the broader class of scoring auctions. The-
ories developed in this field demonstrate that bidders bid according to their psue-
dotypes (Che(1993), Asker and Cantillon(2008)). Specifically in A+B procurement
10In the special case where CD = CU , the model does not rule out cases where qb is not equal to
qc. In fact, it is perfectly fine for the bid to ‘travel along’ the iso-score line. One realistic argument
against differences between qc and qb, however, is that bidders don’t like to build a reputation of
not being able to fulfill the bid. In other words, working on time and fulfilling the contract as bid
is considered at least a weakly-dominant strategy.
15
(a) No bid skewing under certainty








Figure 1: Bid skewing under certainty and uncertainty
This figure shows the main difference in equilibrium bidding behaviors of a model of construction
certainty, and a model of construction risk. (a) shows that if no uncertainty, bidders’ equilibrium
choices of qb and qc will be the same and coincide with qFB determined by the tangency. There would
be no bid skewing. (b) and (c) give two cases where bid skewing exists in a model of production
uncertainty. In particular, bidders would optimally choose qb and qc that are almost surely different
from each other (with only exception of qb = qc when CD = 2CU ). Moreover, either qb or qc overlaps
with qFB only by ‘luck’, suggesting that the auction mechanism might cause inefficiency. Note that
(b) and (c) are only two representative cases out of 6 in terms of their relative locations with qFB .
They are suppressed from the figure because of limited space.
auction setting, one’s pseudotype is the social cost of performing the project by this
bidder—the combination of private construction cost, expected incentive/disincentive
payments, and the public cost or externality. In a scoring auction, the bidder’s op-
timal choice of quality (herein the number of days to complete) is chosen separately
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from the optimal choice of score. And one’s pseudotype is a sufficient statistic at
deriving equilibrium bidding behaviors: the bidder with the lowest psuedotype, or
psuedocost, wins the contract in the same way that a buyer with the highest valua-
tion in a standard first-price sealed-bid auction wins the auction with the highest bid.
Since bidders always equate the weight on days in the scoring rule with their marginal
costs of acceleration to obtain the optimal days bid, ex-post efficiency is guaranteed
by the tangency (of the iso-score line and own cost curve) and ex-ante efficiency is
guaranteed by the competitive nature of auction (Lewis and Bajari (2011a)). How-
ever, this conclusion is crucially relying on the latent assumption of certainty, and
once uncertainty is introduced, the efficiency of A+B breaks down.
3.4 Optimal Choice of qb, qc, and Equilibrium Bidding Strat-
egy
A simple comparison of (9) with (5) shows that with uncertainty built into the model,
bidder’s optimal target construction time is such that the cost curve takes the slope
of the Left Hand Side of Equation (5) (in absolute value). Instead of CU , which is










σ2β2 which depends on the values of CD, CU , σ
2, β. Since σ2 and β are both
positive, the denominator e
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b − q∗c )
is positive for any qb not equal to qc, making the numerator greater than 1. Thus,






b − q∗c ))/e
1
2
σ2β2 can be greater than, equal to, or less
than 1, depending on the relevant parameter values, meaning that the optimal target
time under uncertainty can be greater than, equal to, or less than its counterpart
in a world of certainty. Given this, whether bidders choose a tighter schedule under
construction uncertainty or a looser one is an empirical matter.
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The bidder’s optimal choice of qc and qb are defined implicitly by both (5) and (6):
q∗c = g1(CU , CD, β, σ
2, qe) (10)
q∗b = g2(CU , CD, β, σ
2, qe) (11)
Clearly, the optimal time quantities don’t depend on the bidder’s draw on α—material
cost or fixed cost does not affect things on the margin. If one takes Taylor expansion
of (6) to the second order, one gets:








That is, the magnitude of bid skewing is determined linearly in the ratio of CU and
CD, and also linearly in the amount of project risk σ.
Since I introduce uncertainty as the main feature of the model, the types in this
paper are all in the sense of expectation. Let C0(CU , CD, α, β, σ
2, qe) = CUq
∗
b +
C(q∗c ;CU , CD, α, β, σ
2, qe) for the bidder type (α, β), where C0 is indeed the bidder
(α, β)’s pseudotype or pseudocost (combination of expected public externality of CUq
∗
b
and private minimized expected cost of production). This is an analog of valuation
from the standard first-price sealed-bid auction paradigm.
Having figured out the optimal choice of time quantities, what is left for the bidder
to do is choose a price to complete the score. I will follow the theoretical literature on
scoring auction to briefly illustrate the process. Now consider the following change of
variables:




b ≡ score = CUq∗b + P
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Then the problem now can be interpreted as one where a firm having cost potential v
with cumulative distribution H(·), proposes to meet the level of score b. The objective
function for the bidder is then:
EΠ(q∗c , q
∗
b , P |CU , CD, α, β, σ2, qe)
= [P − C(q∗c ;CU , CD, α, β, σ2, qe)]Pr{win|CUq∗b + P}
= [b− v]{1−H(b−1(b))}N−1
The equilibrium price can be obtained by simple reference to the usual result of
first-price sealed-bid auction paradigm and change of variables.
3.5 Inefficiency of A+B
Recall in Section 3.2 that if there is no construction risk, the tangency of social
usercost and bidder’s cost function gives the first-best outcome (both ex-ante and
ex-post efficient) of A+B auctions, where private interest is willingly aligned with
social interest. And this welfare outcome holds as long as CD ≥ CU . Even with
uncertainty introduced into the model, the first-best point is still the same tangency
as long as expectations are correct in equilibrium11. The failure to arrive at the
first best under uncertainty, though, is due to the fact that the possible CD becomes
relevant in private optimization and does affect things on the margin, as well as the
fact that the scoring rule does not fully address the whole set of incentives bidders
face.





11Think about a scenario where the government has perfect information on private construction
cost and the knowledge of uncertainty, then the benevolent government can and will push the society
onto the tangency point if it is able to command the private firm to do so(or if it owns the firm)
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Figure 2: Ex-post inefficiency with uncertainty
q∗FBi is the first-best quantity at the tangency, while the private parties actually act




ci). Figure 2 shows that as long as cost
is convex with respect to time, choices of qc that are different than qFB will lead to
ex-post inefficiency, regardless of who wins the auction12.




ci). Thus it is
possible that the rank of bids by T2 might fail to align with the rank by T0, causing
a failure to achieve ex-ante efficiency, as depicted by Figure 3. In the case described
in Figure 3, the second bidder (in terms of social welfare, or T0) with bigger α and
β (hence overall more costly) becomes the winner by bidding very low and targeting
late. And the overall more efficient bidder, 1, chooses qb and qc fairly close to qFB but
end up losing the auction. This is an outcome caused by the auction mechanism with
construction uncertainty that possibly rewards slower and more expensive bidders
through their equilibrium bidding behaviors. One thing to note is that Figure 3 only
illustrates one possible combination of underlying structural parameters that result
12For illustration purpose and limitation of space, Figure2 only lists one of the possible cases of
relations between qb and qc where qc 6= qFB . It should be clear that T1 is above T0 as long as the
convexity assumption of the cost remains to hold.
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T10 = CU ∗ qFB1 + C1(qFB1; θ1)
T12 = CU ∗ qb1 + C1(qc1; θ1)
T20 = CU ∗ qFB2 + C2(qFB2; θ2)
T22 = CU ∗ qb2 + C2(qc2; θ2)
Figure 3: Ex-ante inefficiency with uncertainty
in the displacement shown here, if one observes that the displacement is caused by
either winner’s qb much higher, or her qc is much lower, or both, compared to the
choice variables of the social-welfare-maximizing bidder.
One might feel that the first-best outcome is too much to ask for, since the theory
demonstrates that inefficiency always follows due to winners’ choices of production
rates that differ with the tangency. Then what seems to be a more appropriate
question to ask is: can the auction mechanism assign the project to the bidder with
the lowest social cost of production (i.e. T1)? That is, what we are interested in is
whether awarding the contract on the basis of T1 selects the bidder who maximizes
welfare subject to the constraint that they produce at a sub-optimal rate (qc)—a









c2; θ2) and say Bidder 1 is the low bidder in T1. Referring to








c2; θ2) we see
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that the model does not rule out the possibility that Bidder 2 wins the auction with
a sufficiently low qb.
4 Descriptive Evidence
4.1 Data
The dataset of this paper was constructed mainly with data publicly available from
Caltran website, along with several other sources. A total of 225 A+B contracts with
1341 bids were observed in the period of 2003-2013. The variables of the dataset are
grouped into four parts: contract-level key variables, contract characteristics, bidder
characteristics, and ex-post performance variables and they are summarized in Table
2 and Table 3. Although this data set is a panel, I only make use of the cross-sectional
variations for the estimation.
An average project is estimated by Caltran engineers at about $26 million and
average A parts is about $24 million. These highway contracts are comparably large
with engineer estimates of days at around 352 days. Bidders’ days bid are on av-
erage 212 days, or approximately 61% of engineer days estimates. On average, 6.9
bidders participate in an A+B auction, with the minimum number of bidders of 2
and maximum of 1413. Usercosts vary across projects, from as low as $1600 to almost
$100,000, with the average of $14,769. The traffic volume can be very different for
different project sites. An average bidder is a bit over 100 miles distant to the project
it bids on. About 77% of the projects get full or partial federal funding. Furthermore,
the majority of the projects belong to four categories: widen&realign, pavement, road
rehabilitation, and bridge work.
13There are a couple of auctions ending up with only one bidder participating, but they were
taken out from my data set for estimation purpose.
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Also, I collect information on contract-level characteristics that can account for
inter-contract differences in job complexities including: number of bid items, disad-
vantaged business goals, number of proposals, number of addendums, pages of con-
tract advertisements, and amounts of design details14. And the last block of variables
prescribes to bidders. 97% of the bids are submitted by California-based firms, and
5% by a joint venture (an entity that consists two or more different firms bidding as
one bidder). I follow the literature practice and regard a firm as ‘Fringe firm’ which
bids in no more than 4 auctions in the entire sample period. Out of 170 different en-
tities that participated in these 225 auctions, 105 of them are fringe firms, although
they only account for 12% of all bids. Furthermore, I also made dummy variables on
the largest 4 firms in terms of number of auctions they’ve participated in: Granite,
Diablo, RGW and O.C. Jones, and these firms together account for about one fifth
of all bids. Also included in the data set is participation experience, which is the
number of A+B auctions that a bidder has bid on in the sample period (average is
16.3 times) and winning experience, which is the number of A+B auctions that a
bidder has won in the sample period (average is 2.8 times).
The next part of the data consists ex-post performance variables collected from
payment vouchers from ‘Major Construction Payment and Information’ of Caltran’s
Accounting Division. In the monthly payment vouchers, the Caltran engineers keep
14Bid items are generally specific tasks that bidders bid on and serve as a proxy of the project
complexity. And this count ranges from 11 to 345 with an average at 120. Disadvantaged business
goals is in percentage terms, a lower bound on the amount of work that has to be performed by
disadvantaged business, and simply capturing Caltran’s preference to disadvantaged business to
take part in the construction. Number of proposals indicates how many firms took the efforts to get
the proposals and showed interest to participate in the bidding and it also gives some idea on the
competitiveness of the project besides ‘number of bidders’. Number of addendums to the original
advertised contract special provision accounts for the changes and modifications that take place
after advertisement and before bidding. Most of the projects only need a couple of addendums to
make things complete, although a few contracts call for 10 or more addendums to supplement. I
also estimated the content volume of each contract by looking at number of pages and counting how
many subsections in special provisions that are dedicated to construction details.
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records of how the projects proceed. They do so by counting weather days as well as
the total work days and its break down to actual work days, contract change-order
days and other days. They are summarized in Table 3.
Analysis of participation patterns of A+B auctions calls for data on both A+B
auctions and similar traditional auctions(the ones that could’ve become A+B auc-
tions), which inevitably takes huge amount of time and efforts that the author of this
paper alone cannot afford. Participation, however, should not be a major concern
primarily due to the following argument: projects of Caltran become available only
when a need is detected, which happens randomly at least to the bidder. Another
way to put it is—instead of picking one project out of a menu of projects lying in
front of the bidder, any one bidder faces a queue of upcoming projects that is chosen
by nature. In this sense, the nature of the industry greatly reduce bidders behaviors
of project selection and participation15.
4.2 Graphical Analysis
Out of these 225 projects, 187 have been completed by Sep 30th, 2014. 78 contracts
finished exactly on time, 69 contracts finished early, and 40 projects finished late. Out
of the 40 late projects, 17 projects were charged penalties and 12 of them got penalties
removed in the end. Figure 4 Graph (a) shows a histogram of the variable Lateratio,
which is the percentage of days late over days bid. Negative numbers mean early
completion, 0 on-time completion and positive numbers late delivery. On average,
projects get delivered 3% late according to data recorded by resident engineers.
If there was no risk in construction, then we would expect Graph (a) to be one
15Also, Lewis and Bajari (2011) performs a reduced form logit model of bidder participation and
their conclusion is that“ There is little evidence that A+B contracts attract more or less participation
relative to the control group...matching is essentially based on size and distance, rather than A+B
status”.
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(a) Histogram of Late ratios ( qa−qbqb ) (b) Scatter of qa − qb against q
e
(c) Scatter of qa − qb against log(qe) (d) Scatter of qa − qb against CU
Figure 4: Evidence of model predictions
where there is only one mass point at 0, meaning that contractors would all just finish
on time. And this is because if certainty is true, there is no incentive for the bidder to
go either early or late when she can perfectly avoid both after the contract is awarded.
Fact is, instead, we observe sizable fluctuations of final construction time, which is
suggestive of the shocks that took place during the construction process causing the
deviations.
Also, this may be suggesting that there exists a difference between bid days and
target days systematically since apparently the risk of construction ‘favors’ ‘late’ sig-
nificantly over ‘early’— most of the early projects are only early by a few days whereas
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the late ones tend to be substantially late and causing real damages. With the initial
look at the data, one finds that this may be consistent with bidders’ aggressive bid-
ding behaviors, that is, bidding fewer days than what is actually planned, compared
with other possibilities. Moreover, this might be made possible by the likely low rate
of enforcement on Caltran’s end, and we will come back to this point later.
Recall from Section 3 Equation (12) that the difference between the equilibrium
choices of qb and qc is a function of CU , CD and σ, thus larger the uncertainty,
larger the difference between the two quantity choices. It is also plausible to treat
scales of projects as a proxy of project risk since uncertainty tends to scale with
project duration, complexity, etc. Hence if the theory is correct, we should expect
the difference between the realized days, qa, and days bid, qb, to scale with engineer
days qe or similar measures of project magnitudes. Remember that we can use qa in
place of qc in the analysis here because of the assumption that qa is a realized outcome
of qc. Graph (b) and (c) of Figure 4 show that indeed this is the case (even though
the ‘fan out’ pattern is much more obvious in Graph (c) with log engineer days on
the x-axis).
Graph (d) of Figure 4 shows that there is no clear association between usercost
and qa−qb, and this does not contradict with the theory: only the ratio of CU and CD
affects qa − qb and the individual effects of CU and CD are not obvious or definitive
given that we do not know how CU affects CD.
As the theory indicates, the magnitude of CD and its comparison with CU identify
which case out of 3 the bidders’ behaviors fall into: conservative bidding (qb > qc),
honest bidding (qb = qc), or aggressive bidding (qb < qc). There are many factors
that potentially affect CD: reputation considerations, time value of money, and en-
forcement rate of Caltran, etc. Explicitly building these factors into the mechanism
analyzed here would go very much beyond the scope of this study. Thus I treat the
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effect of all these factors as one-dimensional variable CD and only argue about the
direction of the impacts of these factors on CD.
Weather days, Contract change-order days and Other days are potentially good
ways of bidders’ adaptation after contract approval and hence actual lower enforce-
ment rate on Caltran’s part. Focusing on how bidders adjust their ex-post work rate
in response to production shocks and using data from Minnesota DOT, Lewis and Ba-
jari (2013) find evidence of adaptation of bidders along dimensions such as “working
on days that they are not required to”. A look into Caltran’s official guidelines and
standard specifications of highway projects suggests that this also seems to be the
case in California. Contractors, facing high-powered incentives and tight schedules,
tend to work positive hours on days (such as weather days) that don’t count toward
project deadline. And what seems also happening is that project engineer can grant
extra days through Contract Change-order days or Other days if they find doing so
serves the best interest of the state. Hence the enforcement of A+ B contracts may
not be 100% as one would expect.
Table 3 gives readers some idea of possible adaptation and low enforcement rate
by the three ratios: weather days/qe, CCO days/qe, and Other days/qe. These ratios
are large and take up a significant portion of the total duration of the projects.
However large and significant, these statistics are not so convincing if not compared
with traditional or A-only projects. Table 1 provides a part of Table 1 from Lewis
and Bajari (2011) where the counts of different days are compared between A+B
and A-only projects over 2003-2008. Although weather days and other days are not
significantly greater than those of A-only projects, working days for A+B contracts
are significantly lower than that of A-only contracts, meaning a drastically higher
ratio of weather days and other days to working days. And this is evidence favoring
bidders’ adaptation along this margin and Caltran’s low enforcement rate on A+B:
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bidders work on weather days (which do not count toward deadline) proportionately
more in A+B and Caltran is linient and grant porportionatly more Weather days
and Other days for A+B projects which alleviates the schedule pressure on bidders
to some extent.
Taken together, evidence given in this section suggests that the broad picture of
A+B bidding that emerges here is one where bidders find it optimal to target late
(big qc) and bid early (small qb). Nonetheless, this is only an initial look at the data
rather than solid arguments. Formal structural estimation needs to be performed to
truly lift the veil of A+B bidding.
4.3 Reduced-form Evidence on Bidding
To know a little bit more about A+B auction outcomes than the summary statistics, I
performed 3 reduced-form OLS regressions: log price, days bid, and days late (qa−qb)
on various contract and bidder covariates. And they are:
logpriceij = πp0 + πp1LogCUj + πp2Numberofbiddersj + πp3Logengestj
+ πp4Logtrafficj + πp5Distanceij + πp6Distance
2
ij + πp7Federalj
+ πp8Biditemsj + πp9Dbgoalj + πp10Addendumsj + πp11Pagesj
+ πp12Designdetailsj + πp13Instatei + πp14Fringefirmi + πp15Granitei
+ πp16Diabloi + πp17RGWi + πp18OCJonesi + πp19JVi + πp20ParExpij
+ πp21WinExpij + πp22Win.Parij + IndustryFEj + Y earFEj
+DistrictFEj + errorij
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qbij = πb0 + πb1LogCUj + πb2Numberofbiddersj + πb3Logengestj + πb4Logtrafficj
+ πb5Distanceij + πb6Distance
2
ij + πb7Federalj + πb8Biditemsj + πb9Dbgoalj
+ πb10Addendumsj + πb11Pagesj + πb12Designdetailsj + πb13Instatei
+ πb14Fringefirmi + πb15Granitei + πb16Diabloi + πb17RGWi + πb18OCJonesi
+ πb19JVi + πb20ParExpij + πb21WinExpij + πb22Win.Parij + IndustryFEj
+ Y earFEj +DistrictFEj + errorij
DaysLateij = πe0 + πe1LogCUj + πe2Numberofbiddersj + πe3Logengestj
+ πe4Logtrafficj + πe5Distanceij + πe6Distance
2
ij + πe7Federalj + πe8Biditemsj
+ πe9Dbgoalj + πe10Addendumsj + πe11Pagesj + πe12Designdetailsj + πe13Instatei
+ πe14Fringefirmi + πe15Granitei + πe16Diabloi + πe17RGWi + πe18OCJonesi
+ πe19JVi + πe20ParExpij + πe21WinExpij + πe22Win.Parij + IndustryFEj
+ Y earFEj +DistrictFEj + errorij
The estimation results are shown in Table 4. All other things held constant, increase
in usercost suggests increase in price bids, decrease in days bid and higher propensity
of being late. On average one more participant of the auction leads one existing bidder
in the same auction to shade its price offer by 2.5% as well as its days bid by 11.87
days, indicating the extent of competition of the auction environment. Number of
bidders, however, does not significantly impact the performace of the contract, which
may give support to the Independent Private Value (IPV) assumptions of the model.
The scales of the projects, measured by logs of engineer estimates, are associated
with higher price bids, longer project duration bids and fewer days late. The large
literature on highway construction has a consensus that the further a bidder is from
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the job site, the higher both the base cost and acceleration cost, with higher price
bid and days bid. The estimates agree with this. What is also worth mentioning is
the group of contract complexity variables having positive association with days bids
and price bids, suggesting that more complex jobs lead to longer projects and higher
prices presumably caused by higher costs. The group of firm type variables suggests
heterogeneity in firms’ tradeoffs between base costs and acceleration costs. Moreover,
fringe firms tend to finish the projects early compared with bid four firms. And
this can be due to the more conservative bidding behaviors of fringe firms: bidding
relatively more days helps to avoid being late. The two experience variables and their
interaction seem to affect days bid very much although they have a neutral effect
on price bids. Nonetheless, no sensible empirical analysis can be done without first
figuring out the specifics of the auction mechanism and bidder optimization process.
Thus no structural interpretation shall be inferred out of the results shown here.
5 Structural Approach
5.1 Empirical Model from First-Order Conditions
As is seen in Section 3, the cost function of each individual bidder has her own
acceleration parameter β in the theoretical model. To facilitate empirical estimation,
I take the following variation of the cost function:






eXijθβ+εβij , qij ∈ [qcpij , qej ] (13)
where β0 substitutes for βijq
e
j , and is common to all bidders and all contracts. Xij is a
row vector of bidder and contract characteristics and θβ is a column vector of param-
eters. εβij captures bid-specific random errors, and εβij




the individual component, allowing for variations in acceleration costs across bidders
and contracts. β0 captures the common part of the curvature of the cost function and
furthermore, and it takes the economic meaning of elasticity of acceleration since (let










) +Xijθβ + εβij (14)
That is, holding all other things constant, for one percentage decrease in construction
time, the amount of acceleration cost increases by β0%. Bear in mind the economic
meaning of β0 since substitution of β0/q
e
j with β is needed because one needs to avoid
same variable (hereby qe) appearing on both sides of an equation. And this point will
be clearer as we go on. Note that the new β has no subscripts associated with it,
meaning that apart from the effect of qe, we are again estimating how costly for the
bidders to accelerate, on average.
















Note that the unobservable bid-specific true penalty CDij does not show in Equa-
tion (14). To go further, let us make the following identification assumption:
Identification Assumption 1: Assume q∗bij − q∗cij = δijσij = (δ̄ + Zijγ + εδij)σij,






iid∼ N(0, σ2εδ). Specifically, it consists of the common part δ̄ and the individ-
ual part Zijγ, where Zij accounts for the individual characteristics that potentially
affect CDij. This specification is motivated by the theory (Equation (12)) where the
difference between these qb and qc are solely determined by CDij , CUj and σij. Thus
31
δij should incorporate things that affect CDij and clearly, this quantity should vary
across bidders and auctions. Although bidders know their δij given prior information
they have, δij remains random to the researcher thus δ̄ and γ should be estimated.
























j ) + εσij. There are two reasons
for modeling uncertainty this way: first, project scale serves as a natural proxy of





ij ), the standard deviation still linearly depends on project scale: larger
projects tend to be more risky even after normalization. Also, εσij
iid∼ N(0, σ2εσ), and
E(εσij|qej ) = 0,∀i, ∀j.
Identification Assumption 3: εβij ⊥ εδij, εβij ⊥ εσij, εδij ⊥ εσij, ∀i, ∀j.





























βε2σij + errorij (17)








j )εσij− 1√2πβ εσij +
1
β
εβij and has mean zero. The term
1
2
βε2σij ceases to follow a normal distribution
and the mean is not zero, but the impact from this term is only on the intercept.
16Detailed derivation is provided in Appendix.
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Nevertheless, Model (17) suggests that a simple OLS suffices in giving us unbiased
estimates of β, w, δ̄, γ and θβ, although the estimation is subject to heteroskedasticity.
The estimation results are shown in Table 5. For the degree between separation of
qb and qc, I make use of firm types and variables on experiences and interactions with
Caltran to account for the heterogeneity in firms’ choices of δ’s, as these factors tend
to associate with firms’ reputation, demand for more cash flows, and expectation
of Caltran’s enforcement rate on A+B contracts. Four similar models were tested
on and estimates across specifications are comparable. Model (1) is the baseline
model presuming constant δ̄ without year or district fixed effects; Model (2) is the
baseline model including year or district fixed effects; Model (3) includes firm type
interactions with qeln(qe); Model (4) includes firm type and experience interactions
with qeln(qe).(Industry fixed effects are included in all models. Year and District
fixed effects are included in all models except (1).) I go with Model (4) for model
interpretations since it is the full-blown version of the estimation.
β is significantly estimated at 1/10.99 = 0.091, thus β0 is expected to center on 32
(0.091multiplied by average of engineer days), unveiling the underlying acceleration
cost in this industry: speeding up by 1% of the schedule induces a 32% increase on
acceleration cost; or, acceleration cost more than triples with a 10% cut on schedule.
The second striking finding in this regression result is that the statistically signif-
icant and robust coefficient on (qeln(qe))2, indicating a positive estimate of w, which
immediately claims the existence of construction uncertainty. Since the parameter
before this term is 1
2
βw2, the value of w gets pinned down at 0.0104. The average of
engineer-estimated days being 352.43 and average of the log of this variable 5.68, one
obtains the expected standard deviation of 22.09 days on the 352-day project. Or
that the expected uncertainty is around 6% of the project scale, once normalized by
engineer days. Different project sizes lead to different levels of risk: in this sample of
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data, the normalized uncertainty σN ranges from 3.9% to 7.6%.
Another important finding is the overall aggressive bidding patterns of bidders,
as illustrated jointly by the estimates of coefficients on qeln(qe), and its interactions
with firm types and experiences. Although not statistically significant, estimated co-
efficient of qeln(qe) is negative across all specifications and the magnitudes compare.
Also, different firm types differ in how they shade qb from qc. As opposed to other
bidders, fringe firms tend to bid more ‘honestly’ by choosing days bid closer to con-
struction target time and this is consistent with the story of this paper: fringe firms
are small bidders who seldom participate in A+B auctions and hence lack experience
both in speedy construction and interactions with Caltran. And these factors proba-
bly make fringe firms value reputation and future business with Caltran more, and yet
at the same time make them inexperienced in and hence overestimate how Caltran
enforces the contracts. To make the above analysis even more credible, the estimated
coefficients on interactions of qeln(qe) and participation and winning experiences are
both negative, showing again how experience and interactions with Caltran help in
aggressive bidding behaviors. Taken together, the δ’s center at -4.42, with min of
-5.64 and max of -2.75, suggesting that a representative bidder would shade her bid
down from the target time by 4.4 times of the standard deviation of production un-
certainty. And this finding corresponds to the Case 3 in the theory, suggesting that
the true penalties the bidders face should be at least lower than twice of the road
user costs.
5.2 Estimating Distributions of Normalized Bids
Following Guerre, Perrign, and Vuong(2000), the structural analysis of auction data
recovers the underlying distribution of types by investigating the distribution of ob-
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served bids. Relevant to scoring auctions, the underlying distribution of bidders
pseudotypes can be identified from observed scores, number of bidders and contract
and bidder characteristics. Specifically in A+B setting:






where vij is bidder i’s pseudocost, bij bidder i’s score submitted for contract j, Nj
the number of bidders that participate in auction j, and Xij the set of contract and
bidder characteristics.
If the projects were homogeneous, then simple non-parametric estimations of un-
conditional cumulative distribution and densities of scores would suffice. Highway
procurement projects, to a very large degree, are complex and unique in nature. So
the valuations of different projects should be conditioned on project and firm char-
acteristics. If we want to control heterogeneity, nonparametric approach proposed
by Guerre, Perrign, and Vuong(2000) would suffer a great deal from the curse of
dimensionality. Hence, a two-step psemi-parametric approach that resembles that of
Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis (2014) is implemented.
The first-step regression function takes the following form:
bij
b̄j
= Xijφ+ uij (19)
where the dependent variable is the normalized bid (own score divided by engineer
score), and Xij is the combination of contract and bidder characteristics. It is not
surprising that the variance of error term increases with the scale of the project
if a regression is run of RHS variables on absolute dollar amounts of bids. Hope
is that normalization of scores can take away a huge amount of the cross-auction
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heteroskedasticity.














That is, the distribution of the observed bids can be feasibly identified using the
distribution of the estimated residuals û, and this is done by substituting in the
empirical distribution of û in place of G. The densities of scores can be obtained
by the following way: for each of the normalized scores, form a new distribution by
centering the û’s on each Xijφ̂; get the density estimate for each normalized score;
divide the densities of normalized scores by the corresponding engineer score to obtain
the estimated densities for the absolute scores. And the estimation results are shown
in Table 6.
5.3 Recovering Bidders’ Pseudocosts, True Costs and α’s
As shown in the above section, estimated residuals û and its distribution from the
previous regression can identify bidders’ pseudocosts. Then, bidders minimized costs
can be identified by pseudocost minus usercost times days bid, according to the scoring
rule. Furthermore, identification of α’s is made possible with knowledge of firms’
minimized expected costs and acceleration parameter β along with the estimates of
effects of bidder and contract characteristics in the structural estimation. Finally,
by referring to the certainty case equilibrium in the theory I am able to predict the
qFB’s with the estimates obtained here. Without surprise, the first-best quantities
are overall significantly different than qb and qc, signaling non-negligible social welfare
loss. Detailed discussion of inefficiency is provided in Section 6.
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The estimated structural elements are shown in Table 7 which gives a full picture
of A+B bidding. Estimated mark-up ratios are on average 21.71% and highly skewed
toward zero. According to literature on highway construction industry, profit margins
are usually quite small (single digits) in this competitive industry. So I record the
median of 10.73% to be in line with previous studies. Material or fixed costs on
average almost take up the whole part of true costs of construction, only leaving an
average of 7% as acceleration costs. I find this result no surprising since the estimated
construction target days by bidders are considerably greater than the days they bid.
The discovery of no concrete (and thus expensive) acceleration that is carried out with
A+B procurements is one of the defining differences of this paper with previous studies
where acceleration is argued to be cheap and affordable with observed significant
cut in schedules. My analysis, instead, shows that acceleration is indeed costly even
though not much acceleration costs are observed/incurred, precisely due to the reason
that bidders are taking advantage of the mechanism by bid skewing and try to avoid
genuine acceleration.
6 Policy Analysis
6.1 Evaluation of Current A+B Design
Table 8 shows bid skewing patterns and gives the counts and frequencies of 6 different
ranks of qb, qc and qFB. The calculated ex-post efficiency loss due to the difference in qc
and qFB is given at the end of Table 7 and the number is big. On average, distortions
are measured at $1.73 million, and it is 7.9% of estimated private construction costs.
Taken together, these 225 contracts procured A+B incur a total efficiency loss to the
society of $389.25 million in this 11-year period.
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Furthermore, bid skewing might also result in failure of ex-ante efficiency. If we
rank the bidders by their T0 and compare this rank order with the current bidders, we
find that 56 bidders out of 225 with lowest social cost potential (of their respective
auctions) got replaced by current winners. That is, the current A+B mechanism
assigns jobs to wrong/less efficient bidders at about 25% of the time. A further
look into the data shows that almost all of the 56 auction losers (but actual efficient
bidders) have considerably lower material/fixed costs, a situation that quite resembles
Figure 3. And the 56 current winners are those who skew significantly more compared
to the efficient bidders who lost the biddings, by either having a rather low qb or
significantly pushing up qc or both. Hence society is put at a bad position for that
with a fairly good frequency, the auction mechanism fails at detecting the efficient
agents, on top of distorting everyone’s incentives.
What about second best? Given the expected ex-post inefficiency, one might
wonder whether second best can be arrived at if we assign the contracts based on
their true social costs produced, i.e., T1. Unfortunately, we still see 27 displacements
out of 225 if we rank the bidders by their T1 and compare the rank order with the
current bidders. This 12% displacement rate cannot make us confident enough to say
that second best can be achieved with current A+B design.
6.2 Counterfactual Analysis
In this part of the paper, I try to perform a counterfactual analysis where Caltran
can change the auction rules and see whether better social outcomes follow.
The most obvious tool that Caltran has is the policy parameter, CU . One can
tell roughly from the theory that as CU increases, both days bid and target days
would decrease as a response mainly because of costly acceleration. A careful look at
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Equations (5), (6) and (10), however, shows that CU not only affects qb and qc in the
direct way, but also influences them through the effect it has on δ, along with CD.
As mentioned earlier in Section 3, CD is a one-dimensional variable that captures
several factors: reputation considerations, time value of money, and enforcement rate
of Caltran, etc. Note also that it is the ratio of CU and CD that has an impact on bid
skewing. Thus what seems a correct way of predicting how CU and CD together change
things is to first think about how CD is potentially affected by CU . First, greater CU
might mean that project acceleration is more important to Caltran compared to
ones with little penalties, thus bidders incur a higher reputation cost of being late.
Second, greater CU pushes up CD even when bidders account for the time value of
money. Last, increasing CU does not necessarily associate with higher enforcement on
Caltran’s part, and thus does not guarantee a higher CD at the same time. Integrating
all these effects, I adopt a ‘constant-return-to-scale’ type of relation between CU and
CD, that is, CU affects CD positively and in a linear way. Thus, the ratio of CU and
CD remains the same when CU is increased and the impact on qb and qc is simply
governed by the acceleration parameter β.
I consider 4 interesting policies Caltran can adopt besides the current one: a ‘low-
powered’ incentive scheme with 50% CU , even more ‘high-powered’ bidding rule with
200%CU , a highly aggressive one with 500%CU and lastly, forcing A+B back to A-only
projects without CU . Instead of running simulations, I perform simple calculations
using structural estimates obtained from the OLS regression. The advantage of such
a practice, aside from the sheer simplicity, is that we can stick to the current bidders
and auctions which we already know a lot about.
The procedure in the counterfactual is the following: solve for qb and qc for different
incentives with estimates from previous section; refer to the cost function to calculate
acceleration costs and total costs under each incentive schemes with new qc(for A-only,
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costs boil down to α’s); formulate bidders’ pseudocosts by combining total costs of
production and B parts; rank the bidders by their pseudocosts for the 3 new incentive
schemes and rank according to α’s for A-only bids; pin down the winners which are
the ones with lowest pseudocosts(or α) for each auction; calculate winners’ price bids
by deducting their B parts from the second-lowest bidders’ pseudocosts if in scoring
auctions, second-lowest bidders’ α’s if A-only auctions (the justification of this is the
Revenue Equivalence Theorem), and these price offers are Caltran’s payments for the
projects; finally, calculate externality (admitting the original CU as the true per-day
externality) and mark-ups as usual.
Table 9 provides the counterfactual results. Under different incentive intensities,
days bid qb changes by relatively small amounts even when incentives are as high as
five times, again demonstrating that genuine acceleration comes at significant costs. qc
expands or shrinks in the same way and by the same absolute amounts as qb, showing
that ex-post inefficiency cannot be eliminated with changes in auction rules. Total
costs increase substantially with greater incentives because of costly acceleration,
while the externality sees only a small decrease, rendering the total social costs under
‘high-powered’ incentive schemes to be significantly higher than that of low- or no-
incentive ones. Payment-wise, Caltran faces a much bigger budget challenge when
greater incentives are imposed than low or no incentives are at play. And these bigger
checks from Caltran are mainly driven by increasing costs, rather than higher mark-
up ratios of bidders. Combining the considerations of commuter welfare, private
construction cost, and government budget, I argue for procuring schemes with lower
incentives than current or even conversion back to traditional contracts. And this
policy implication is direct and intuitive since under current framework, bidders’
actual construction behaviors are indeed not much different than what they would
have been had the projects procured the traditional way.
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One thing to note, though, is that we treat the current CU as the true per-day cost
to commuters in the above analysis. Lewis and Bajari (2011a) argue that the current
user costs implemented are lower than the true costs to a large degree and they give
their estimation of user costs which are multiples of the current ones. If this is true,
then the externalities under each policy given in my counterfactual results might be
consistently lower than the truth. Simple calculations of externalities and social costs
with higher user costs reveal that low-incentive schemes are still preferred even when
true user costs go up to five times the current ones. Thus my policy implications and
suggestions are robust to this possibility.
6.3 Lessons Learned from A+B Procurement Auctions
At this point, another legitimate question to ask is: is there any room for Caltran
to make any changes along other margins than CU? How about changes in engineer-
estimated days qe? My intuition is that Caltran has to be very careful dealing with
this choice variable since qe strictly sets the upper bound for the time component
of the bid, thus tighter qe might deter entry and thus hurt competition. Detailed
analysis of bidder participation and bidder types distribution is needed to draw any
policy implication on this matter.
It may seem natural to argue that incentives might be less distorted once Caltran
raises the level of contract enforcement. For example, Caltran can demand its resident
engineers to keep stricter logs of production progress and cut on unneccessary grants
of CCO days or Other days. This effectively raises bidders’ perceived penalties of
being late and redirects resources to genuine acceleration. One concern here is that
it might correct things too much so that bidders get too conservative in bidding, that
is, they might skew their bids from under target days to well above and we begin to
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have inefficiency coming from the other direction.
7 Conclusion
It has been over 20 years of A+B auctions practiced across states since the Federal
Highway Administration encouraged DOT’s around the U.S. to implement this inno-
vative procuring method. Aiming at aligning social interests with private ones and
taking advantage of competitive mechanisms, policy makers embraced A+B design
after observing the seemingly large cuts in construction time and increased commuter
gains, although with acknowledgement that A+B does put pressure on government
budgets. The striking finding in this paper, however, is that bid skewing exists and
the current A+B auctions are in fact not quite different with traditional contract-
ing method (A-only). Moreover, self-selected construction time that is different from
the expected social-optimal time causes efficiency loss (on average $1.73 million per
contract or 7.9% of estimated private construction costs) and the auction mechanism
can fail at picking the socially-efficient bidders.
The main take-way from this paper is that design of scoring auctions calls for
careful weighing of aspects of incentives in their totality and failure to do so often
results in distortions of various sorts. Note that this paper does not aim to question
the justification of scoring auctions, but to point out places that have been overlooked
by policy makers which can cause real damages. The potential welfare gains from
using scoring auctions can only be elicited with thorough investigation of bidding
motives, behaviors and environmental elements. Although a delicate matter, there




“UNBALANCED BIDS” IN HIGHWAY
PROCUREMENTS
1 Introduction
Auctions are very important means of buying projects in government procurement
because of the uniqueness of the projects, transparency, and private information of
costs. In particular, highway procurement auctions across the U.S. usually take the
form of Unit-Price Contracts (UPCs), where the department of transportation (DOT)
gives quantity estimates for different tasks (or items) of the project and the bidders
attach unit-price bids on each of the tasks and form a single total bid (the inner
product of the unit-price vector and the quantity vector). During the construction
phase, the DOT makes progress payments, usually monthly, to the contractor for
tasks completed in the previous month. Moreover, the payments are determined by
the actual quantities incurred although the total bids ex ante are evaluated based on
the DOT estimates. A forward-looking contractor, who cares about the present value
of the stream of payments, would want to structure the unit-price bids in such a way
that the expected total present value is maximized. Intuitively, this can be done with
shifting more weight toward early tasks and tasks that the bidders believe to overrun
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compared to the DOT estimates, while maintaining the same total bid. These two
types of bid skewing lead to what is generally known in the industry as “unbalanced
bids”.
The goal of this paper is to detect and quantify bid skewing in highway procure-
ment contracts. In this aim, I start with a theory of bid skewing to present the
incentives of bidders to skew the unit bids in certain ways. First of all, I demonstrate
that, there is always a positive incentive for bidders to put more weight toward ear-
lier items than later ones since bidders maximize total present values ex ante that
discount values of later items, while the discounting is not captured by the scoring
rule. Second of all, I follow the lead of Athey and Levin(2001), Bajari, Houghton and
Tadelis (2014), Miller (2014) on bid skewing along the quantity dimension, which ar-
gues that bidders tend to skew more on tasks they believe to overrun compared to the
DOT estimates that determine the ranks but not entirely the final payoffs. Private
information plays a key part in this type of bid skewing but not for the former type,
or “front loading” where the sequence of tasks are common knowledge and certain.
The empirical strategy exploits the availability of the data on unit task costs from
the Contract Cost Data book published yearly by Caltran. These unit costs are
“the mechanically weighted average of the awarded bidders prices and are affected
by location, time, quantity in the job and size of the item” (the Contract Cost Data
book, Caltran, 2011-2013). Although much of the individual heterogeneity in item
costs are missing, the unit costs can serve as good proxies for costs of all the bidders of
all projects within the same year and the common trend of the costs can be captured.
The central hypothesis of this paper is that bidders of UPC projects in equilibrium
skew their bids toward early and overrun tasks. To test for the hypothesis, I regress
logs of unit bid-cost ratios on the binary variable of whether the task is done and
paid for in the early half of the project, how much the task is overrun (or underrun),
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the interaction of the previous two variables, along with other covariates that impact
the variations in bid-cost ratios. I find that both the coefficients on “overrun” and
the interaction term of “early” and “overrun” are positive and significant, providing
support for the theory prediction. Although the effect of “early” itself is not signif-
icant, early items do get skewed more if they are overrun. Moreover, there is some
evidence suggesting the more aggressive bid skewing behaviors of winners although
the evidence is not abundant.
Naturally, one important and interesting question regarding unbalanced bids is
whether profitable bid skewing pertain within the auction mechanism or it can be
competed away. The answer is yes: bid skewing is always taking place and it has
both theoretical and empirical support. Theory shows that no matter how high (or
low) the total bid is, bidders always make themselves better off by bid skewing along
both dimensions, and this is independent of the extent of competition! As is shown in
the regression results, “overrun” and interaction of “early” and “overrun” positively
affect the unit bid-cost ratios in the predicted way. Thus, the existence of bid skewing
is not a result of poor competition or weak participation of auctions.
Moreover, the overall correct bid skewing on the item quantity variations is sug-
gestive of private information on ex post shocks which warrants profitable skewing.
In addition, a test of winners’ informational rents offers no evidence of private infor-
mation on quantity variations for winners beyond the amount available to all bidders.
It remains to be an interesting and unsolved puzzle why Caltran’s quantity estimates
are systematically biased compared to all bidders’ estimates. Nonetheless, the finding
here provides further support on the Private Value (at least partially) as opposed to
Common Value assumptions on highway procurement auctions.
To my knowledge, this is the first study to empirically test and quantify the extent
of bid skewing, covering both unbalanced bids along the time dimension and the item
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quantity dimension. The results provide guidance to studies that need to correct for
bid skewing to recover costs from bids. Furthermore, this paper offers new evidence on
Private Value assumptions of highway procurement auctions from a granular project
task level.
This paper is closely related to the emerging literature of bid skewing (Athey
and Levin (2001), Ewerhart and Fieseler (2003), Bajari, Houton and Tadalis (2014),
Miller (2014), Meng Liu (2015)), with the novelty of directly testing and quantifying
bid skewing with granular data on costs. Also, the theory builds upon contributions
in scoring auction literature such as Che(1993), Asker and Cantillon(2008), Asker
and Cantillon (2010).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theory of “unbalanced
bids”, highlighting the incentives for bid skewing. Section 3 discusses the data and
provides descriptive evidence. Section 4 presents the empirical model with regression
results and discusses policy questions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theory of Unbalanced Bids
2.1 Front Loading
Let risk-neutral bidders be indexed by i, and let contracts be indexed by j.
For simplicity, let there be 2 tasks per project: an early task (which incurs T1j
units) that needs to be performed and paid for in Period 1, and a late task (which
incurs T2j units) that needs to be performed and paid for in Period 2. The order of
tasks, T1j, and T2j are common knowledge to all auction participants. In addition,
there is no uncertainty in the quantities T1j and T2j: the department of transportation
predicts perfectly the quantities of each task. Let the unit-price bids bidders attach
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on the tasks be B1ij and B2ij. Then the total bid of Bidder i for Project j is Sij =
B1ijT1j +B2ijT2j.
Let the bidder- and project-specific discount rate be ρij, and let the private unit
costs be C1ij and C2ij. Then the present value of payment to bidder i competing
with Sij is Pij = B1ijT1j + ρijB2ijT2j and the present value of the cost is Cij =
C1ijT1j + ρijC2ijT2j.
Let the indexes be dropped for simplicity. The bidder maximizes her present-value
payoff by choose B1 and B2:
MaxΠB1,B2 = P − C = B1T1 + ρB2T2 − (C1T1 + ρC2T2) (1)
subject to S̄ = B1T1 +B2T2
With substitution of S̄ = B1T1 + B2T2 into (1), the optimization problem becomes
one where the bidder decides only on B2:
MaxΠB2 = S̄ − (1− ρ)B2T2 − (C1T1 + ρC2T2) (2)
subject to B2 ≥ 0
Apparently, the bidder’s optimal choice of B2 would be B2 = 0, which leads to a
final bid of S = B1T1 where B1 > 0. That is, the sequential feature of the UPC leads
to a full skew of the bid on the early portion of the project, and this is true for all
bidder types (any realization of C1, C2, and ρ). In reality, however, bidders cannot
skew their bids as freely as they would like since significant skews away from costs
might lead to disqualification from the bidding. Thus, front loading is rewarding yet
risky business.
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2.2 Uncertainty in Task Quantities
Often seen in practice is that both the DOT and all bidders have imperfect information
ex ante with regard to the exact quantities of tasks to be used in construction. Thus,
all auction participants have to make guesses on the quantities. Let T1j and T2j be the
estimate of the DOT on the true quantities t1j and t2j. Also, let bidder i’s estimates
be Q1ij and Q2ij. All the guesses can be different, but they should “converge” to the
true parameters “in the long run”. That is,
E[T1j] = t1j, E[T2j] = t2j,∀j
And,
E[Q1ij] = t1j, E[Q2ij] = t2j,∀i, j
Then the total bid is:
Sij = B1ijT1j +B2ijT2j
The ex ante estimated payment is:
Pij = B1ijQ1ij + ρijB2ijQ2ij
The ex ante estimated cost is:
Cij = C1ijQ1ij + ρijC2ijQ2ij
Again, let the indexes be dropped for simplicity. The bidder maximizes her ex-
pected present-value payoff by choose B1 and B2:
MaxΠB1,B2 = P − C = B1Q1 + ρB2Q2 − (C1Q1 + ρC2Q2) (3)
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subject to S̄ = B1T1 +B2T2
With substitution of S̄ = B1T1 +B2T2 into (4):
MaxΠB1,B2 = S̄ +B1(Q1 − T1) +B2(ρQ2 − T2)− (C1T1 + ρC2T2) (4)
subject to B1 ≥ 0, B2 ≥ 0
It is apparent that ∂Π
∂B1
= Q1−T1, and ∂Π∂B2 = ρQ2−T2. Then the bidder’s optimal
bidding behaviors can be summarized as follows:
1. If Q1 − T1 > ρQ2 − T2, the bidder fully skews the bid onto Task 1;
2. If Q1 − T1 = ρQ2 − T2, the direction of skewing is ambiguous;
3. If Q1 − T1 < ρQ2 − T2, the bidder fully skews the bid onto Task 2.
Since E(Q1 − T1) = E(Q1) − E(T1) = t1 − t1 = 0 and E(ρQ2 − T2) = E(ρQ2) −
E(T2) = ρt2 − t2 = (ρ − 1)t2 < 0, it is expected that early tasks that are prone to
overrun are more likely to be skewed on. The actual direction of the skew, however,
should be very much affected by how the item’s “overrun” correlates to its “earliness”.
2.2.1 Lump Sum Tasks and Variable Quantity Tasks
In reality, some of the tasks have lumpy quantities that are not subject to ex post
variations. For example, mobilization (setting up shop at the work-site), by definition,
has an estimated and realization quantity of 1. Such tasks are risk-free in terms of the
quantity variations, but together with variable tasks they still warrants bid skewing
and this is well illustrated by an example given in Miller (2014) which is shown in
Figure 1.
Consider a project with 2 items: 1 unit of Mobilization and 400 cubic meters of
concrete. If the bidder bids at cost, total revenue would be equal to total cost no
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Figure 1: Different Bidding Strategies with Two Realizations of Final Quantities
(Miller (2014))
matter how large the overrun or underrun is—the bidder is fully immune to risks and
losses by bidding at cost. A strategic bidder, however, is interested in structuring her
bids in different ways to profit while maintaining the same total bid. Suppose the
bidder overbids on the variable task and underbids on the lump sum task, and there
is an overrun with the variable task, then the bidder is able to make a positive profit
of 200. On the other hand, if the task the bidder overbids on turns out to be less
needed, the bidder suffers a loss of 300. Thus, to profitably structure the unit bids
over different tasks, one needs to skew more on the tasks that likely overrun and skew
less on ones that likely underrun (or lump sum in this case). Clearly, the intuition of
bid skewing toward early and overrun items carries with lump sum tasks.
3 Data
The dataset of this paper was constructed with data publicly available from Caltran
website. I randomly chose eight of all pavement contracts that were awarded in the
period of 2011-2013. The reason for focusing on pavement contracts is that they rep-
resent the most standard and common projects procured by DOTs across the U.S.,
with a high degree of homogeneity in terms of the work. For each contract, a “Bid
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Summary” document in PDF format is downloaded directly from the Caltran web-
site1 which contains information on basics of the project, total bids and ranks of all
the bidders along with bidders’ information, list of subcontractors of the winner, and
detailed breakdown of the item-level bids for all the bidders. Summary statistics on
the contract level are shown in Table 10. On average, a highway pavement contract
has an Engineer Estimate at around 5 million dollars with an estimated 70-day con-
struction length. The number of bidders is on average 6.75 with minimum at 4 and
maximum at 12, and the number of items, or tasks, for a typical project ranges from
19 to 65 with the average of 40.
Since most of the analysis of this paper takes place on the item level, patterns of
data on the 2084 items bids are relevant and presented in Table 11. The key variable
of interest in this study is the ratio of unit bid to unit cost on item level, which
is obtained by integrating information on item cost from the Contract Cost Data
book published yearly by Caltran. On average, the variable bcratio is 1.31 with the
standard deviation of 1.37: bid dispersion is sizable, and may not be fully attributed
to cost heterogeneity. Since this measure naturally skews to the left, taking logs may
lead to more sensible results for later regression analysis.
Another source of the data is the ex post payment vouchers collected from Caltran
Accounting Office web page which keep records of the final quantities actually used for
each item as well as the breakdown of usage by payment periods (usually monthly).
early is equal to one if more than half of the item value is produced in the early
half of the project and zero otherwise. overrun is calculated by realized quantity
over estimated quantity for each item, and this variable centers at 1.065, meaning an
average of 6.5% increasing in the final quantity compared to the original estimate.
1“Bid Summary” is located by entering the unique contract number on the “Bid Summary Search”
page.
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(a) Histogram of “overrun”, all tasks (b) Histogram of “overrun”, variable tasks
Figure 2: Histogram of overrun
Focusing only on the items with variable quantities and excluding those with lumpy
units, this measure has an average of 1.1. As Figure 2 illustrates, there is a significant
amount of variation in overrun: some of the items are dropped and not used in the
construction phase thus the actual quantities are zeros, while others have overruns of
multiple of the original estimates. Moreover, the variable overrun is heavily skewed
to the left with a long tail on the right, which is not surprising since the distribution
is, by definition, bounded from below.
4 Empirical Model and Results
4.1 Test for Front Loading
Based on the analysis in Section 2.1, a sensible hypothesis to test for front loading is
the following:
Hypothesis 1 : Other things held constant, in equilibrium bidders skew bids more on
early tasks than later tasks.
Let k denote tasks and let Rijk = Bijk/Cijk to denote the task-level bid-cost ratio.
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Then the testable implication can be represented by the following regression:
Rijk = r1 + β11Earlyijk + β12No.ofBiddersi + εijk (5)
where εijk is the random error at the task level and No.ofBiddersi is the number of
bidders bidding on project i. The null hypothesis (No Front Loading) is: β11 = 0,
and the alternative hypothesis (Front Loading) is: β11 > 0.
Also, projects differ in scales and magnitudes, thus it is reasonable to argue that
bigger and longer projects provide more room for benefits of bid skewing.
Hypothesis 2 : Front loading is more severe in bigger, longer projects.
Let Logengesti denote logs of engineer estimates on the project total costs, which
is a natural measure of project scales, and let Early ∗ Logengestijk denote the inter-
action of Earlyijk and Logengesti. Then the testable implication can be represented
by the following regression:
Rijk = r2 + β21Earlyijk + β22Logengesti (6)
+ β23Earlyijk ∗ Logengesti + β24No.ofBiddersi + εijk
where the null hypothesis is: β23 = 0, and the alternative hypothesis is: β23 > 0.
The theory dictates that when holding the total bid constant, bidders can front
load their unit bids to increase profit. Thus, in equilibrium winners of the contracts
can push down the total bid while maintaining the same profits if they choose to front
load. That is, profitable bid skewing is more likely to be associated with higher-ranked
bidders.
Hypothesis 3 : Higher-ranked bidders tend to be more aggressive in their skews.
Let Winnerijk ∗Earlyijk denote the interaction of winners’ item bids and whether
53
the item is early, then the regression equation becomes:
Rijk = r3 + β31Earlyijk + β32Logengesti + β33Earlyijk ∗ Logengesti (7)
+ β34Winnerijk ∗ Earlyijk + β35No.ofBiddersi + εijk
where the null hypothesis is: β34 = 0, and the alternative hypothesis is: β34 > 0.
Table 13 shows results for the regression equation (5), (6) and (7). The first
column tests for Hypothesis 1 with task-level log bid-cost ratio as the dependent
variable. Surprisingly, the coefficient of interest on the variable Early is negative
and statistically significant, favoring the alternative hypothesis of “no front loading”
rather than “front loading”. Careful thoughts, however, must be given before one
jumps into the conclusion of “no front loading” or even “back-end loading”. One
reasonable suspicion is that the part of “other things held constant” of Hypothesis
1 has not been met, giving rise to possible omitted-variable bias: if the bidder not
only skew bids onto early items but also onto items that are prone to overrun, then
omitting the variations in overrun could cause the coefficient on Early to be biased
downward, if Early is negatively associated with Overrun. And a careful look at the
data provides evidence of the negative correlation of these two variables, which is
shown in Table 12. Thus, a more justifiable estimate on Early can be obtained only
when Overrun and their interactions are included in the same regression equation.
The positive and significant estimate on the coefficient of Logengest ∗ Early in
Column (2) of Table 13 supports the hypothesis that larger projects give more room
for profitable front loading. As for Hypothesis 3, the data does not give much support
to reject the null: winners are not significantly different than other bidders in terms
of how much they skew the bids. Also included in all regressions is the variable No.of
bidders which gives variations of competitiveness across contracts, and the coefficient
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is negative and significant across all specifications, suggesting the negative effect of
competition on all bid-cost ratios.
4.2 Test for Front Loading AND Bid Skewing on Quantity
Overruns
Hypothesis 4 : Other things held constant, in equilibrium bidders skew bids more on
tasks that are likely to overrun.
Hypothesis 5 : Early tasks that have larger ex post mis-estimates (by DOT) tend to
have larger skews (higher bids).
Let Overrunijk to denote the task-level ratio of final quantity and estimated quan-
tity. Then the testable implication can be represented by the following regression:
Rijk = r5 + β51Earlyijk + β52Overrunijk + β53Earlyijk ∗Overrunijk (8)
+ β54No.ofBiddersi + β55Logengesti + β56Earlyijk ∗ Logengesti + εijk
If the theory is correct, then it is expected that both β52 > 0 and β53 > 0.
Results for the above regression equation are shown in Table 14. For the first
specification with all tasks included, the coefficient of Early remains significantly
negative while the coefficient on Overrun is as predicted. What is relieving, however,
is that this model is flawed since it includes lump sum quantities which do not allow
variations by definition—according to the theory, only bids on variable tasks respond
to quantity shocks in the predicted way while bids on lump sum tasks only “passively”
absorb the effects of bid skewing from the variable tasks. When only logs of bid-cost
ratios of variable tasks are regressed on, the coefficients of both variables of interest
are positive and significant: overrun in quantities warrants bid skewing, and moreover
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Figure 3: Histograms of log bid-cost ratio for lump sum tasks and variable tasks
overrun in the early half leads to additional bid skewing.
Figure 3 gives an overlay of the histograms of log bid-cost ratio for lump sum
tasks and variable tasks where it is obvious that lump sum tasks has a significant
mass below zero. Also it clearly shows that the two distributions are distinct with
different means, variances, and overall behaviors. A two-way t test performed on
these two groups supports the above finding that log bid-cost ratios of lump sum
tasks are statistically lower than those of variable tasks.
4.3 Test for Winners’ Private Information on Quantity Vari-
ations
Now, I want to test whether winning bids reflect ex ante private information of shocks
on item quantity estimates. In this aim, I interact Winner with Early, Overrun, and
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Early*Overrun, to capture their differential effects on winners’ bid-cost ratios.
Rijk = r6 + β61Earlyijk + β62Overrunijk + β63Earlyijk ∗Overrunijk (9)
+ β64No.ofBiddersi + β65Logengesti + β66Earlyijk ∗ Logengesti
+ β67Winnerijk ∗ Earlyijk + β68Winnerijk ∗Overrunijk
+ β69Winnerijk ∗ Earlyijk ∗Overrunijk + εijk
If there are information rents, both β68 and β69 should be greater than zero.
Table 15 reports results of the above regression: none of β67, β68, or β69 is signif-
icantly different from zero, indicating that the bidding patterns of winners are not
systematically different from all other bidders. Thus there is not enough evidence for
private information on quantity variations for winners beyond the amount available
to all bidders. One very interesting question arises though, is why Caltran’s quantity
estimates are systematically biased compared to all bidders’ estimates. Nonetheless,
the finding here provides further support on the Private Value (at least partially) as
opposed to Common Value assumptions on highway procurement auctions2.
5 Conclusion
The unique feature of unit price bidding of highway procurement auctions across the
U.S. gives rise to profitable unbalanced unit bids: shifting more weight toward early
tasks to get paid early and tasks that the bidders believe to overrun compared to the
DOT estimates, while maintaining the same total bid. As long as the rules regarding
UPCs are not changed, bidders have every incentive to skew their bids in these two
2Note that the total bid is the inner product of unit costs and estimated quantities, and it is
perfectly possible that common values might be present at the unit cost level which the current
analysis cannot falsify
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directions. Moreover, the overall correct bid skewing on the item quantity variations
is suggestive of private information on ex post shocks, although it remains to be an
interesting and unsolved puzzle why Caltran’s quantity estimates are systematically
biased compared to all bidders’ estimates.
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Table 1: Outcomes from Completed Comparable Standard and A+B Projects, 2003-
2008, Lewis and Bajari (2011)
Standard A+B
Contract Days 260.1 171.4*
(234.1) (114.4)
Working Days 234.8 171.1
(210.1) (115.0)
Weather Days 74.06 80.85
(71.91) (81.44)




Table 2: Summary statistics of Caltran A+B projects, 2003-2013
Contract-level key variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Engineer Estimate($M) 26.37 30.58 0.78 274.67
Bid (A part)($M) 23.96 30.02 0.55 445.28
Bid/Engest 0.94 0.22 0.38 1.99
Engineer days 352.43 230.65 45 1550
Days bid 211.66 164.83 20 1550
Bdays/Engdays 0.61 0.21 0.13 1
# of bidders 6.88 2.41 2 14
Usercost($) 14768.78 11907.81 1600 93985
Contract characteristics
Traffic counts 121373 75527 1425 286750
Distance (miles) 107.33 200.71 0.15 2888
Federal 0.77 0.422 0 1
Bid items 120.01 76.74 11 345
Dbgoal 5.36 5.22 0 29
Proposals 24.92 12.62 4 75
Addendums 2.13 1.83 0 14
Pages 391.49 157.81 132 1413
Design details 84.45 42.89 4 253
Bidder characteristics
Granite 0.07 0.26 0 1
Diablo 0.05 0.21 0 1
RGW 0.04 0.21 0 1
OCJones 0.04 0.19 0 1
Joint Venture 0.05 0.22 0 1
Fringe firm 0.12 0.33 0 1
Instate 0.97 0.16 0 1
Participation experience 16.28 18.61 0 111
Winning experience 2.78 3.40 0 21
N 1341
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Table 3: Summary statistics of ex-post performance variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Days bid(qb) 167.37 135.88 27 813
Actual workdays(qa) 171.73 141.76 27 813
Days Late (= qa − qb) 4.99 30.83 -75 167
Late ratio (= (qa − qb)/qb) 0.03 0.20 -0.35 1.46
Weather days 108.19 104.82 0 621
Weather days/qe 0.41 0.45 0 3.42
CCO days 48.59 89.40 -22 999
CCO days/qe 0.13 0.15 -0.03 0.91
Other days 13.09 56.87 0 661
Other days/qe 0.05 0.19 0 1.96
N 187
This table shows the ex-post performace variables collected from payment vouchers from ‘Major
Construction Payment and Information’ of Caltran’s Accounting Division. In the monthly payment
vouchers, the Caltran engineers keep records of how the projects proceed. They do so by counting
weather days, the total work days and its break down to actual work days, contract change-order
days and other days. Out of these 225 projects, 187 have been completed by Sep 30th, 2014. 78
contracts finished exacly on time, 69 contracts finished early, and 40 projects finished late. Out of
the 40 late projects, 17 projects were charged penalties and 12 of them got penalties removed in the
end.
Weather days are “Days on which the Contractor is prevented by inclement weather or conditions
resulting immediately therefrom adverse to the current controlling operation or operations, as deter-
mined by the Engineer, from proceeding with at least 75 percent of the normal labor and equipment
force engaged on that operation or operations for at least 60 percent of the total daily time being cur-
rently spent on the controlling operation or operations”. Although contractors will not be charged
for a working days when above conditions for a weather day is met, they can choose to work on the
portion of the day when the weather becomes suitable for construction. Contract change order days
(CCO days) are generally working days when the contractor performs tasks by the change orders
that add or deduct work items from the original plan. Normally these days are not counted toward
project deadline and the extra work performed is usually compensable. It seems that Caltran has a
broad definition of ‘Other days’ that are roughly days they grant the contractor as time extension
for various reasons. ‘Other days’ are counted as working days, too.
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Table 4: Reduced-form regression of log price bids, days bid and days early
Log Price Days Bid Days Early
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Log CU -0.002 -48.620*** 6.352
(0.013) (7.381) (6.131)
Number of bidders -0.025*** -11.728*** 0.368
(0.003) (1.402) (1.089)
Log engest 0.918*** 68.174*** -9.160**
(0.011) (5.528) (4.068)
Log traffic 0.017** -4.424* 1.110
(0.007) (2.610) (2.118)
Distance 0.0002*** 0.046 -0.044
( 0.00006) (0.029) (0.049)
Distance2 -8.00e-08** 4.71e-06 0.00007
(3.40e-08) (0.00001) (0.00009)
Biditems 0.001*** 0.751*** 0.186
(0.0002) (0.147) (0.136)
Dbgoal 0.002 1.192 -0.271
(0.002) (0.983) (0.644)
Fringe firm 0.022 28.690*** -11.732*
(0.020) (9.780) (6.436)
Granite 0.017 -13.894 19.178*
(0.025) (11.211) (11.134)
Diablo 0.150*** 40.079*** 4.000
(0.025) (13.145) (9.704)
RGW 0.022 6.679 2.119
(0.024) (12.555) (6.183)
OCJones -0.048* 4.352 8.393
(0.028) (13.718) (11.562)
JV 0.030 -4.248 -13.667
(0.025) (18.836) (11.521)
Par.experience -0.002* -1.275*** -0.447
(0.001) (0.451) (0.374)
Win.experience -0.006 -8.576*** -1.622
(0.005) (2.303) (2.511)
Win.exp x par.exp. 0.0001** 0.164*** 0.029
(0.00005) (0.027) (0.027)
Industry FE Y Y N
Year FE Y Y N
District FE Y Y N
N 1341 1341 187
R2 0.6999 0.9726 0.1356
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** corresponds to p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Structual estimation of acceleration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Log CU -4.565 -11.764** -11.075** -10.990**
(4.679) (5.320) (5.325) (5.307)
Engdays 0.857 0.943 0.650 0.606
(0.707) (0.647) (0.594) (0.601)
qelnqe -0.084 -0.100 -0.056 -0.047
(0.113) (0.103) (0.094) (0.095)
qe2lnqe2 5.21e-06** 5.68e-06*** 5.04e-06*** 4.88e-06***
(2.05e-06) (1.83e-06) (1.61e-06) (1.62e-06)
Bigfour x qelnqe 0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.005)
Fringe firm x qelnqe 0.020*** 0.019***
(0.005) (0.005)
par.experience x qelnqe -0.00002
(0 .0002)
Win.experience x qelnqe -0.0005
(0.001)
Log engest 20.344*** 21.000*** 20.083*** 19.879***
(4.440) (4.456) (4.361) (4.358)
Log traffic -4.970*** -6.319*** -5.873*** -5.858***
(1.892) (2.150) (2.110) (2.103)
Distance 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.008
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Distance2 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001
(8.92e-06) (9.71e-06 ) (9.51e-06) (9.51e-06)
Biditems 0.318*** 0.215** 0.218** 0.217**
(0.096) (0.101) (0.099) (0.099)
Dbgoal 1.480*** 1.107 1.198 1.180
(0.435) (0.782) (0.780) (0.779)
Fringe firm 16.302*** 23.808*** -7.914 -5.378
(6.037) (6.483) (8.190) (8.621)
Bigfour 21.531*** 20.016*** 13.900 8.117
(6.031) (5.733) (8.761) (9.579)
Par.experience -1.248*** -0.712** -0.688** -0.613
(0.293) (0.278) (0.278) (0.452)
Win.experience -7.628*** -6.987*** -6.883*** -5.907***
(1.495) (1.431) (1.422) (2.089)
Win.exp x par.exp 0.133*** 0.091*** 0.089*** 0.088***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Constant -137.379*** -128.627** -111.353* -110.813*
(51.585) (58.629) (57.179) (57.106)
N 1341 1341 1341 1341
R2 0.8240 0.8467 0.8494 0.8496
Model (1) is the baseline model presuming constant δ̄ without year or district fixed effects; Model (2)
is the baseline model including year or district fixed effects; Model (3) includes firm type interactions
with qeln(qe); Model (4) includes firm type and experience interactions with qeln(qe). Industry fixed
effects are included in all models. Year and District fixed effects are included in all models except
(1). Standard errors are in parentheses. *** corresponds to p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for
p < 0.1. 63










































The dependent variable is the normalized score: score divided by the engineer score (user-
cost*engineer days + engineer estimate). Year, district and work type fixed effects are included.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** corresponds to p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1.
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Table 7: A broad picture of A+B: estimation of structural elements
Parameter/Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
β 0.091 0.044 - -
β0(= βq
e) 32.07 20.99 4.10 141.04
w 0.0104 - - -
σ(= wqeln(qe)) 22.09 17.13 1.78 117.98
σN(= wln(q
e) = σ/qe) 0.059 0.006 0.039 0.076
δ -4.42 0.65 -5.64 -2.75
qe 352.43 230.65 45 1550
qa(N=187) 174.77 156.72 12 1229
q∗b 211.86 164.74 20 1550
q∗c 310.94 236.41 34.11 1912.01
qFB 256.02 168.78 4.13 1144.75
Score($M) 27.56 34.70 0.60 505
Pseudocost($M) 25.52 33.03 0.12 492.32
Total Cost($M) 21.97 28.41 0.11 433.11
Acceleration Cost($M) 0.90 4.05 0 61.30
α($M) 21.07 28.47 0.06 433.11
Acceleration Cost/Total Cost 7.14% 19.60% 0 80.00%
Bid total (A part)($M) 23.96 30.02 0.55 445.28
Ex-ante markup ratio 10.73%(Median) 65.41% 0% 400%
Ex-post efficiency loss($M) 1.73 4.30 0 57.60
N 1341
Table 7 gives the estimated structural elements and shows a full picture of A+ B bidding. The
second block gives the readers an overall impression of firms’ choices of days bid and construction
target time, with first-best days included for comparison and reference. As is clearly shown, days bid
are consistently skewed under construction target time. Estimated mark-up ratios are on average
21.71% and highly skewed toward zero. According to literature on highway construciton industry,
profit margins are usually quite small (single digits) in this competitive industry. So I record the
median of 10.73% to be in line with previous studies. Material or fixed costs on average almost take
up the whole part of true costs of construction, only leaving an average of 7% as acceleration costs.
The calculated ex-post efficiency losses due to differences in qc and qFB are given at the end. On
average, distortions are measured at $1.73 million, and it is 7.9% of estimated private construction
costs. Taken together, these 225 contracts procured A+B way incur a total efficiency loss to the
society of $389.25 million in this 11-year period.
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Table 8: Count and frequency of various qb, qc and qFB ranks
Rank Count Freqency
qb < qFB < qc 679 50.6%
qFB < qb < qc 346 25.8%
qb < qc < qFB 316 23.6%
qc < qb < qFB 0 0%
qc < qFB < qb 0 0%
qFB < qc < qb 0 0%
Table 8 shows the counts and frequencies of 6 different ranks of qb, qc and qFB . No bid skewing such
that qc < qb is observed.
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Table 9: Counterfactual analysis
Variable/Outcome Current 50%CU 200%CU 500%CU A-only
qb 211.66 219.28 204.04 193.97 -
(164.83) (164.83) (164.83) (164.83) -
qc 310.94 318.56 303.32 293.25 352.43
(236.41) (236.41) (236.41) (236.41) (230.65)
qFB 256.02 256.02 256.02 256.02 256.02
(168.78) (168.78) (168.78) (168.78) (168.78)
Accl. Cost($M) 0.90 0.45 1.80 4.50 0
(4.05) (2.03) (8.10) (20.30) -
Total cost($M) 21.97 21.52 22.87 25.56 21.07
(28.41) (28.37) (28.91) (33.46) (28.47)
Externality($M) 5.27 5.39 5.16 5.01 5.88
(7.94) (8.01) (7.88) (7.79) (7.70)
Total social cost($M) 27.24 26.90 28.03 30.58 26.94
(34.99) (35.01) (35.35) (39.09) (34.61)
Caltran payment (N=225, $M) 22.14 20.50 22.15 24.17 19.68
(27.92) (28.50) (29.30) (31.05) (28.48)
Markup ratio (Median, N=225) 10.73% 11.53% 8.03% 9.36% 11.40%
Table 9 provides the counterfactual results. Under different incentive intensities, days bid qb changes
by relatively small amounts even when incentives are as high as five times, again demonstrating
that genuine acceleration comes at significant costs. qc expands or shrinks in the same way and
by the same absolute amounts as qb, showing that ex-post inefficiency cannot be eliminated with
changes in auction rules. Total costs increase substantially with greater incentives because of costly
acceleration, while the externality sees only a small decrease, rendering the total social costs under
‘high-powered’ incentive schemes to be significantly higher than that of low- or no-incentive ones.
Payment-wise, Caltran faces a much bigger budget challenge when greater incentives are imosed than
low or no incentives are at play. And these bigger checks from Caltran are mainly driven by increasing
costs, rather than higher mark-up ratios of bidders. Combining the considerations of commuter
welfare, private construction cost, and government budget, I argue for procuring schemes with lower
incentives than current or even conversion back to traditional contracts. And this policy implication
is direct and intuitive since under current framework, bidders’ actual construction behaviors are
indeed not much different than what they would have been had the projects procured the traditional
way.
One thing to note, though, is that we treat the current CU as the true per-day cost to commuters
in the above analysis. Lewis and Bajari (2011a) argue that the current user costs implemented are
lower than the true costs to a large degree and they give their estimation of user costs which are
multiples of the current ones. If this is true, then the externalities under each policy given in my
counterfactual results might be consistently lower than the truth. Simple calculations of externalities
and social costs with higher user costs reveal that low-incentive schemes are still prefered even when
true user costs go up to five times the current ones. Thus my policy implications and suggestions
are robust to this possibility.
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Table 10: Contract-level Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Engineer Estimate($ M) 5.219 5.554 0.526 16.758
Engineer Days Estimate 70.625 30.171 35 120
Number of Bidders 6.75 2.712 4 12
Number of Items 39.375 16.681 19 65
N 8
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Table 11: Item-level Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Bcratio(=Unit Bid / Unit Cost) 1.309 1.373 0.002 15.596 2084
Log(bcratio) -0.085 0.971 -6.11 2.747 2084
Overrun 1.065 1.405 0 20.881 2084
Overrun(items with variable quantities only) 1.1 1.636 0 20.881 1528
Early 0.643 0.479 0 1 1951
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Table 12: Correlation between Early and Overrun
Overrun Overrun(<10) Overrun (Variable Q) Overrun (Variable Q and <10)
Early -0.037 -0.103 -0.025 -0.108
N 1951 1935 1411 1395
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Table 13: Test for “Front Loading”
(1) (2) (3)
Early -0.147*** -5.698*** -5.698***
(0.044) (0.680) (0.678)
No. of Bidders -0.026** -0.028*** -0.028***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Log engest -0.056 -0.056
(0.046) (0.047)
Log engest * early 0.363*** 0.363***
(0.044) (0.044)
Winner * early 0.001
(0.104)
Bidder FE Y Y N
N 1951 1951 1951
R2 0.064 0.109 0.109
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** corresponds to p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1.
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Table 14: Test for “Front Loading” with Quantity Overrun





Early * overrun 0.009 0.040**
(0.017) (0.017)
No.of bidders -0.028** -0.025*
(0.011) (0.014)
Log engest -0.034 -0.026
(0.048) (0.053)
Log engest * early 0.330*** 0.061
(0.045) (0.048)
Bidder FE Y Y
N 1951 1411
R2 0.117 0.076
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** corresponds to p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1.
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Table 15: Test for Private Information on Quantity Variations





Early * overrun 0.0004 0.034*
(0.018) (0.018)
No.of bidders -0.029*** -0.026*
(0.011) (0.014)
Log engest -0.034 -0.026
(0.048) (0.053)
Log engest * early 0.329*** 0.060
(0.045) (0.048)
Winner * early -0.030 -0.038
(0.115) (0.136)
Winner * overrun -0.049 -0.039
(0.031) (0.029)
Winner * early * overrun 0.056 0.042
(0.038) (0.037)
Bidder FE Y Y
N 1951 1411
R2 0.117 0.077





Derivation of First-Order Conditions (5) and (6) of Chapter One
Recall that the agent’s optimization problem is the following:
MaxΠqb,qc = S̄ − CUqb − Eqa [C(qa; qe, α, β)]− Eqa [D(qa, qb, CD)]























⇒ CU = CD[1− F (q∗b ; q∗c )]










































































e−βtf(t; qc)dt is the moment generating function for the normal random















































































σ2β2 + CU − CDf(qe; qc)(qe − qc) + CDf(qb; qc)(qb − qc) = 0
























= 1− F (q∗b ; q∗c )
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Appendix B
Derivation of Equation (16) of Chapter One






























1− F (q∗b ; q∗c )
















1− F (q∗b ; q∗c )
(q∗b−q∗c )) = ln(1−F (q∗b ; q∗c )+f(q∗b ; q∗c )(q∗b−q∗c ))− ln(1−F (q∗b ; q∗c ))
Let g(q∗c ) = 1− F (q∗b ; q∗c ) + f(q∗b ; q∗c )(q∗b − q∗c ), and h(q∗c ) = 1− F (q∗b ; q∗c ),
Then, g(q∗b ) = 1 − F (q∗b ; q∗b ) + f(q∗b ; q∗b )(q∗b − q∗b ) = 1 − 1/2 + 0 = 1/2, and h(q∗b ) =
1− F (q∗b ; q∗b ) = 1/2.




1−F (q∗b ;q∗c )
(q∗b − q∗c )) at
q∗c = q
∗
b up to the second order:
ln(1− F (q∗b ; q∗c ) + f(q∗b − q∗c )) ≈ ln(g(q∗b )) +
1
g(q∗b )








) + 1− 2F (q∗b ; q∗c ) + 2f(q∗b ; q∗c )(q∗b − q∗c )− 2(1/2− F (q∗b ; q∗c ) + f(q∗b ; q∗c )(q∗b − q∗c ))2
And,
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ln(1− F (q∗b ; q∗c )) ≈ ln(h(q∗b )) +
1
h(q∗b )








) + 1− 2F (q∗b ; q∗c )− 2(1/2− F (q∗b ; q∗c ))2





1− F (q∗b ; q∗c )
(q∗b − q∗c )) ≈ 2f(q∗b ; q∗c )(q∗b − q∗c )




b−q∗c ) is just the area in the
pdf (centered at q∗c ) surrounded by q
∗
b , −q∗b , f(q∗b ; q∗c ), and f(−q∗b ; q∗c ). And this area






1− F (q∗b ; q∗c )
(q∗b − q∗c )) ≈
1√
2πσ
(q∗b − q∗c )




(q∗b − q∗c ) =
1
2
σ2β2 + lnβ + β(qe − q∗c ) +Xθβ + εβ
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